Introduction
Individual criminal responsibility (ICR) is a general principle in both national and international criminal law. However, this principle in international criminal law bears unique traits that make it somehow different than its domestic counterpart.
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Appeals Chamber held in Tadić that:
[t]he basic assumption must be that in international law as much as in national systems, the foundation of criminal responsibility is the principle of personal culpability: nobody may be held criminally responsible for acts or transactions in which he has not personally engaged or in some other way participated (nulla poena sine culpa). In that, he adopted a pragmatic approach. Bringing individuals to justice was to be preferred over the collective assignation of guilt.
2 As history has shown, collective guilt fuels frustration, extremism, and eventually mass violence. In Cassese's words, trials of (alleged) war criminals, 'establish that not all Germans were responsible for the Holocaust, nor all Turks for the Armenian genocide, nor all Serbs, Muslims, Croats, or Hutus but individual perpetratorsalthough, of course, there may be a great number of perpetrators'.
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A strong proponent of international criminal justice, Cassese found that international adjudication of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide has advantages over national adjudication, particularly over domestic tribunals in the territory where the atrocities occurred.
Without being perceived as pursuing political prosecutions, international courts and tribunals can participant in the collective criminal enterprise ' . 10 Yet, he continued, it would be 'immoral' and 'contrary to the general purpose of criminal law … to let those actions go unpunished'. 11 The notion of JCE, although controversial in some respects, was an answer to the dilemma of individual criminal responsibility for collective criminality. 12 Thus, Cassese, endorsing individualized justice as an antidote to collective responsibility, admits that individual guilt attribution is difficult. In fact, by embracing JCE he, to a certain extent, accepts collective responsibility.
In scholarly writing, compelling arguments have been raised in favour of a concept of liability that is specific to international criminality; a concept that expresses the collective nature of international crimes. 13 The gist of the argument is that the extraordinary nature of international crimes calls for a departure from 'ordinary', domestic concepts of liability. ICR, a principle drawn from municipal law, is unsuitable to international criminality. While this debate raises pertinent questions, we will leave it aside for reasons of brevity.
Instead this paper, through an analysis of jurisprudence before the ICTY and the
International Criminal Court (ICC), and the identification of the main (intrinsic and extrinsic)
features of ICR in international criminal law, will seek to identify the sui generis features of the principle. In particular, emphasis will be placed on showing how ICR is used as a tool to enforce international norms and to set an example. In this functional role, ICR is hardly compatible with the principle of personal culpability.
Intrinsic Feature: the Systemic Nature of Criminality
Criminal responsibility as it features in the Statutes of international criminal courts and tribunals, is modelled on concepts derived from national criminal law. Forms of liability such as aiding/abetting, instigation, joint criminal enterprise, co-perpetration and the concept of 10 Ibid. The collective and organizational nature of international criminality is really only captured when those at the top are prosecuted. Only when a prosecutor moves up the hierarchical level is the role of the system fully recognized. However, this comes with evidentiary challenges and, as a result, with pressure on the principle of ICR. Linking senior defendants to individual crimes has generated broad liability theories that are difficult to reconcile with the principle of personal culpability.
ICR in International Law: An Overview
Criminal responsibility in international law is a dynamic concept, subject to constant change. At an abstract level one can capture the developments in the law of ICR in four phenomena, (A) the conception of JCE (B) departure from the national pedigree (C) transformation of liability theories, and (D) the quest for a liability theory that best expresses moral gravity (expressive justice). Since the ICTY Statute does not provide for the concept of common purpose/JCE, the Appeals Chamber based its findings on customary international law and subsumed it under 'committing' in Article 7(1), which it held was justified by pointing to the object and purpose of the Statute and the inherent characteristics of crimes committed in warlike situations.
A. Conception of JCE
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B. Departure from the National Pedigree
The Tadić Appeals Chamber endorsed the Furundžjia Trial Judgment recognizing two distinct theories of liability: JCE and aiding and abetting. 25 The Chamber considered accessorial liability inadequate to hold Tadić liable for the Jaskići deaths. Considering him an aider or abettor 'might understate the degree of (his) criminal responsibility'. 26 The rationale for creating a hierarchy between JCE and aiding and abetting was found in the wording: committing crimes versus aiding and abetting crimes. 27 Moreover, as Cassese wrote in a paper on the limits of JCE, the distinction 27 Part icipants in a JCE are regarded as principals who co mmit crimes whereas aiders/abettors contribute to the commission of crimes as accessories/secondary participants and as such are held to be less culpable than co-comports with the reduced mens rea standard for aiding and abetting. 28 An aider and abettor 'only intends to assist,' but 'does not share the mens rea' of the perpetrator, so that 'in principle, the criminal liability of the aider and abettor is more tenuous (or less weighty) than that of the participant in a common criminal enterprise.'
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The hierarchy between aiding and abetting and JCE was endorsed in case law beyond
Tadić. The Appeals Chamber in Šljivančanin held that, '[a]iding and abetting is a lower form of liability than ordering, committing, or participating in a joint criminal enterprise and may as such attract a lesser sentence'. 30 Empirical research on sentencing confirms that aiding and abetting is regarded less blameworthy than other modes of liability.
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Distinguishing between aiding and abetting and JCE-liability corresponds to the distinction between facilitators and co-perpetrators in some civil law systems. The latter are more closely involved in the commission of crimes than the former. 32 Facilitators are punished less severely as instigators and co-perpetrators who are punished analogous to, or as perpetrators.
While there is no 'proof' to make explicit the civil law influence on developing aiding and abetting into a lesser mode of liability, it is not far-fetched to assume that it is through civil law Judges like Cassese, and later Schomburg, that this categorization emerged.
This hierarchy is at odds with the domestic meaning of JCE and aiding and abetting. Both concepts, drawn from Anglo-American law, constitute forms of accomplice liability. 33 In principle no hierarchy exists between them; it is in the sentencing stage that role-variance and the degree of culpability is expressed. The difference between JCE and aiding and abetting lies in the link to the underlying crime. The latter requires a more specific link to crimes than the former. The common purpose/plan is JCE's distinctive feature. Its scope, as to time and geographical location, has expanded considerably as a result of its application to large-scale enterprises. While the plan must amount to or involve the commission of a crime, it does not require an accused's contribution to a JCE to be criminal. 50 Common plans or objectives may be as broad as persecution, deportation and forcible transfer in a certain area or with regard to a certain group of people. These objectives can be achieved through the commission of specific crimes such as murder, torture and rape. 51 The objective can be even more at a 'meta-level', e.g. the aim to modify the balance of Kosovo through the commission of deportation, murder, forcible transfer and persecution 52 or 'the establishment of an ethnically Serb territory through the displacement of the Croat and other non-Serb population' 53 .
The structure of this type of JCE-liability with criminal objectives at meta-level and specific crimes at micro level, generated a theory of liability where the crimes committed by those on the ground ('relevant physical perpetrators' or 'principal perpetrators') are imputed to those at leadership level. This is a very different form of JCE as conceptualized in Tadić.
The leading case that marks this transformation of JCE is Brđanin. 54 The key finding, changing JCE is that the principal perpetrator does not have to be a member of the JCE. The
Appeals Chamber found that '[w]hat matters is … not whether the person who carried out the actus reus of a particular crime is a member of the JCE but whether the crime in question forms part of the common purpose'. 55 To hold a member of the JCE responsible for crimes perpetrated by a non-member, it is sufficient to show that at least one member of the JCE can be linked to a non-member. When the latter is used by the former as a tool to carry out the common criminal purpose, the other participants of the JCE can be held equally liable for the crimes.
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The appellate ruling in Brđanin introduced a vertical 57 or inter-linked form of JCE. 58 The
Brđanin judgement enabled the prosecutor to apply JCE entirely at leadership level, as long as it can be shown that one of the participants is linked to the physical perpetrator who is used as a tool to carry out the crime(s). On the basis of this ruling the link between the JCE participants and the principal perpetrator(s) effectively loosens. This 'delinking' through the acceptance of non-membership of the physical perpetrator, fits the nature of system criminality as discussed previously.
Loosening the link between participants in the JCE at leadership level and perpetrators at execution level raises concerns with regard to the principle of personal culpability. An attenuated link increases the possibility of guilt by association. 59 We 66 The fact that these views emerged relat ively late into the ICTY's existence is because command responsibility as a liability theory was for a long time ignored by the prosecutor who favoured JCE as a basis of liability. This had to do with the fact that command responsibility, certainly in early cases, has been regarded as narrowly defined, requiring a close link between superiors and subordinates, which was unappealing for a prosecutor seeking to secure convictions. See Sander and Orie, supra note 65.
These are cases of more senior defendants and of operational commanders -commanders in the field -who are further removed from the scene of the crimes than the superiors that stood trial in the early case of Čelebići.
A number of requirements need to be met before a defendant can be held accountable under the theory of superior or command responsibility. 67 Two of these requirements are demanding: that the superior-subordinate relationship is governed by 'effective control', and that a commander knew or had reason to know of subordinate crimes.
Over the years superior or command responsibility has expanded through a broad interpretation of 'commission'. In Blagojević, and Orić 'commission' was interpreted as encompassing all modes of participation listed in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute, planning, ordering, instigating, and aiding and abetting crimes. 68 This position has also been adopted at the ICTR. 69 A further broadening was sought in the Karadzić indictment where the prosecutor alleged that the defendant could be held liable for the crimes that his subordinates, in turn, failed to prevent or punish. In other words, 'commission' in Article 7(3) encompasses superior responsibility, which enables a form of 'superior responsibility for superior responsibility' or 'multiple superior responsibility'. 70 Superior responsibility further expanded by interpreting 'subordinate' as to include those who are not directly subordinate to a superior. 71 Moreover, a superior can be held responsible for acts of 'unidentified' subordinates. It suffices to specify to which group the perpetrator belonged to and to prove that the accused exercised effective control over that group. 72 For the sake of brevity I will not go into the details, but on a broad level, it can be argued that also in the area of superior responsibility notions have been broadened that loosen the link between subordinates and superiors and hence raise concern as to the state of the principle of individual culpability. There appears to be little or no support for the broadening of Article 7(3)
ICTY Statute through the interpretation of the notion of 'commission' or of 'subordinate'.
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D. The Quest for Expressive Justice
A fourth phenomena that describes the development of ICR in international law, is the quest for a liability theory that not only captures systemic crime but that also serves the expressive function of ICL; a theory that enables 'fair labelling'.
Increasingly, value is attached to fair labelling requiring that liability be branded in a way that it fairly represents the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking. 74 In the words of David
Nersessian, 'The fair labelling principle aims to ensure that the label describing criminal conduct accurately reflects its wrongfulness and severity ... . A proper label reflects both the essence and the totality of the criminal conduct.' 75 Fair labelling accounts for the advance of the normative approach to criminal participation and the desire to adhere to the distinction between those who are culpable as principals and those who are culpable as accessories.
In the normative approach a principal is the one who is 'most responsible' in the sense that he or she has decisive influence on the commission of the crime, without necessarily physically committing it. This contrasts to what one can term the 'naturalistic approach' to liability 76 , which takes as starting point the natural world and the reality of cause and effect. In the naturalistic approach the principal is the one who most immediately causes the actus reus/the offence. The accessory is the one who contributes to causing the actus reus. This generally means that the principal is the physical perpetrator and the accessory or secondary party the intellectual perpetrator. Anglo-American complicity law is the classic example of a naturalistic approach.
The previously discussed evolution of aiding and abetting as a lesser form of liability and the concomitant bolstering of JCE-liability as committing, which connotes principal liability, is illustrative for the advance of the normative approach in ICTY case law. Participants in a JCE are to be termed 'principals' and not accessories; accessorial liability would not suffice to express their role as masterminds.
Preference for categorization, i.e. creating a hierarchy of liability in normative terms, is even stronger at the ICC where the distinction between principals and accessories is cultivated The fact that international courts adhere to a principal-accomplice classification is noteworthy, particularly since labelling does not come with a mandatory mitigated or increased sentence in international law. Moreover, accessories are punished for the underlying crimes and not for 'participating in' or 'contributing to a crime'. As John Gardner, in his analysis of complicity law, writes, 'Someone against whom it is proved that they aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of murder by another -for example, by supplying the gun which fired the fatal shot -is herself convicted of murder. So far as her conviction goes, it is just as if she had pulled the trigger herself.' 83 This nuances the distinction between principals and accessories and the need to rely on the classification of 'principal' for the sake of fair labelling.
Cultivating the principal-accomplice distinction and embracing the normative approach to participation is prompted by the desire to bolster the principal-status. 84 Stigmatization through whole, who was the 'real' culprit. 86 Against this background, the naturalistic approach to criminal participation, referring to masterminds as secondary participants, seems inadequate.
Extrinsic Features: Multiculturalis m and Flexibility
The four phenomena described above support the argument that ICR has a sui generis nature.
Moreover, from the overview, two extrinsic features of ICR emerge: multiculturalism and (some) flexibility of the law.
As to multiculturalism, it is not difficult to discern in the JCE/aiding and abetting debate, the common law position, on the one hand, and the civil law position, on the other hand. A similar divide of legal cultures can be discerned in the debate on the distinction between principals and accessories, which brings to light the difference between the naturalistic approach and the normative approach to criminal participation. The former represents Anglo-American complicity law, the latter civil law categorization of modes of liability. The multinational composition of international courts has led to misunderstandings and jurisprudential disputes, pulling liability theories in either a common law or a civil law direction. Eventually, multiculturalism lead to concepts that have no precise equivalent in domestic law and do not belong to either legal tradition and in that sense qualify as truly sui generis.
The second extrinsic feature that surfaces from the overview of case law is the flexibility of legal concepts. Two reasons seem to drive the evolution of the law in the area of liability. One is the quest for the liability theories that best serve the expressive function of international criminal law. The other is a result-oriented approach towards adjudication where judges redevelop and transform theories of liability to make them fit the facts and a certain (senior) class of defendants. The evolution of JCE and superior responsibility shows how fluid the law is and how the need to adjust to reality is an important factor.
In international criminal law, judges play an important role in clarifying and The first decisions by PTCs developing the control of the crime-theory are close to law making and go well beyond the mere task of confirming charges on the basis of existing law.
Culpability Principle unde r Pressure
Concluding Observations
This paper develops the argument that ICR at the international level has a sui generis nature. One can identify intrinsic and extrinsic features that substantiate the distinctive character of criminal responsibility in international law. As to the intrinsic features, ICR in international law is distinctive in its two-tier liability scheme. This is a one-size fits all approach; while masterminds and executioners play a different role in the context of masterminded violence, they are punished on an equal basis for having committed crimes. It serves the expressive value of punishment to punish intellectual perpetrators as if they had blood on their hands. Yet, squeezing a two-tier criminality scheme into a one-tier liability model has caused linkage problems and puts pressure on the principle of personal culpability. The extrinsic features surfaced from an appraisal of ICR in international law. Criminal responsibility in international law is the product of a sui generis adjudication process, marked by multiculturalism and flexibility. The process of international increasingly forging its own path, away from its national pedigree.
According to the above the case of ICR in international law can be termed 'curious' for two main reasons. Firstly, because of the sui generis nature; it is not simply a transplant of domestic legal concepts onto the international level, but a new unique creation. Secondly, although the principle of individual responsibility is widely accepted, it is difficult to realize in practice. On account of the collective and systemic nature of international crimes individual guilt attribution (which would not necessarily reflect reality) becomes more complicated. Moreover, international criminal law's instrumental role, reflected in ICR's flexibility, has generated broad liability theories that border on collective responsibility.
